In the epilogue of Dereliction of Duty author H.R. McMaster writes, "The Americanization of the Vietnam War between 1963 and 1965 was the product of an unusual interaction of personalities and circumstances. The escalation of the U.S. military intervention grew out of a complicated chain of events and a complex web of decisions that slowly transformed the conflict in Vietnam into an American war."

McMaster thoroughly explains how this all came about. In November 1963, following the assassination of JFK, LBJ inherited the Vietnam situation, JFK's advisors and advisory style that limited real influence to his inner circle and treated others, particularly the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), more like a source of opposition than advisors.

LBJ distrusted advisors and had a low opinion of the top military leaders. There was tension between the JCS and the administration and it grew as the situation in Vietnam deteriorated and the U.S. developed plans to become more involved in the war.

Robert McNamara, the Secretary of Defense, became LBJ's right-hand man on Vietnam for three main reasons, according to McMaster: the ineffectiveness of the JCS; LBJ's insecurity; and LBJ's obsession with consensus and his unwillingness to listen to diverse views.

McNamara advocated a policy of "graduated pressure," which he believed would convey American resolve and convince the adversary to change behavior. The JCS recommended a more aggressive program. The military saw only two options: get in or get out.

McMaster writes that McNamara "forged consensus behind fundamentally flawed strategic concept that permitted deepening American involvement in the war without consideration of its long-term costs and consequences."

LBJ preferred McNamara's approach because he didn't think it would jeopardize the 1964 election and it bolstered his image as a moderate candidate. He preferred not to have to make any difficult decisions on Vietnam until after the election.

General Maxwell Taylor, head of the JCS, aided LBJ and McNamara in delivering the military advice they wanted to hear. Taylor frequently obstructed JCS members, misrepresented their position to the President and lied to them. The JCS hurt its own cause by being unable to come to a consensus, often because they were trying to protect or advance the cause of their individual military branch.

LBJ was at a fork in the road in January 1965. He either had to increase military power or begin to negotiate a withdrawal. To increase military power, however, LBJ needed an incident to justify the decision. He found it in February when the Viet Cong attacked an airfield and killed eight Americans. At the end of the month, LBJ committed ground troops to Vietnam, an irrevocable commitment to war. He believed he could pursue a policy of graduated pressure without involving the U.S. in a major war. He refused to discuss Vietnam strategy in a forthright manner with his advisors, Congress or the American public. He deceived Congress about the growing military presence.

By June of 1965, Under Secretary of State George Ball proposed that LBJ and the U.S. cut its losses in Vietnam and begin to negotiate a withdrawal. That proposal, however, was suppressed by McNamara and Secretary of State Dean Rusk.

The Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, which was the aftermath of an attack that probably never happened, declared that "Congress approves and supports the Commander-in-Chief to take all necessary actions to repel any attack against the United States and to prevent further aggression."

LBJ continued to lie to Congress and the American people because he didn't want Vietnam to take attention and support away from his Great Society legislation. The Great Society constrained explorations of policy options in Vietnam. LBJ's advisors preferred to commit the U.S. to a war and lose it rather than withdraw. Civilian advisors did not evaluate military consequences. They thought they could stop if the policy of graduated pressure failed. The JCS meanwhile preferred an intensive air campaign in North Vietnam to destroy key targets. The JCS wanted a clarification of military objectives, but McNamara refused to relay the request to LBJ. McNamara recommended ground troops as an alternate to bombing North Vietnam. Of course, he continued to drastically understate the number of troops being sent to Vietnam and the extent that the U.S. was involved.

In conclusion, McMaster writes, "McNamara and his assistants in the Department of Defense were arrogant. They thought their intelligence and analytical methods could compensate for their lack of military experience and education. They ignored and disrespected history.

"Failure in Vietnam was the result of a uniquely human failure, a responsibility shared by LBJ, his principal military and civilian advisors. The failures were many and reinforcing: arrogance, weakness, lying in the pursuit of self-interest and above all, the abdication of responsibility to the American people."

This book is enlightening and disturbing. It's difficult to envision a worse way that the situation in Vietnam could have been handled.

Although this is a very informative book, the author tends to frequently repeat major concepts long after his point has been made. At times, the book also borders on being a textbook. Although it can be a struggle at times to read, Dereliction of Duty should be a must read for anyone interested in the Vietnam war.

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Dereliction of Duty: Johnson, McNamara, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Lies That Led to Vietnam